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ABSTRACT
Variation in tax policy presents an opportunity to estimate the responsiveness of fertility to prices.
This paper exploits the introduction of a pro-natalist transfer policy in the Canadian province of Quebec
that paid up to C$8,000 to families having a child. I implement a quasi-experimental strategy by forming
treatment and control groups defined by time, jurisdiction, and family type. This permits a triple-
difference estimator to be implemented — both on the program’s introduction and cancellation.
Furthermore, the incentive was available broadly, rather than to a narrow subset of the population as
studied in the literature on AFDC and fertility. This provides a unique opportunity to investigate
heterogeneous responses. I find a strong effect of the policy on fertility, and some evidence of a
heterogeneous response that may help reconcile these results with the AFDC literature.
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Families with children receive special treatment under the tax and transfer provisions of
twenty-six of the twenty-nine OECD countries (OECD (2000)). These policies may be mo-
tivated by a concern for equity: the presence of children alters their parents’ ability to pay,
and so merits recognition in the tax liability assigned to the family.1 In addition to equity
considerations, family ﬁscal policy has eﬃciency consequences if fertility depends on the cost
of children.2 Economic models of fertility following Becker (1960) have studied the inﬂuence
of the cost of children on fertility decisions. In turn, empirical researchers have shown great
interest in trying to uncover evidence of a relationship between prices and fertility. The
endogeneity of key variables has frustrated this eﬀort.3 Hotz et al. (1997) conclude their
survey on the economics of fertility by stating that “the crucial challenge is to ﬁnd plausibly
exogenous variation in proxies for the price and income concepts appearing in the theories.”
Tax policy may present a solution to this problem. If families with children are treated
diﬀerently by tax and transfer policies than families without children, then the tax system
introduces variation in the after-tax price of children. If this variation is unrelated to indi-
viduals’ choices, then it can be used to test for evidence of a relationship between fertility
and prices.
Many researchers have studied the impact of ﬁscal incentives on fertility. In one strand of
the literature, researchers regress an aggregate time series of fertility on policy variables and
control variables.4 Three distinct problems arise in these aggregate time-series studies. First,
the identiﬁcation of policy eﬀects from these regressions relies solely on time-series variation.
This leaves the identiﬁcation vulnerable to trends in unobserved variables. Speciﬁcally, if
diﬀerent cohorts of mothers have diﬀerent unobservable characteristics that are important
for their child-bearing decisions, then time-series variation in general is not suﬃcient to
1See, for example, Pechman (1983) or Davies (1990) for the development of these arguments.
2The cost of a child comprises both the direct cost of the child’s consumption and the opportunity cost of
the parents’ time used in raising the child. Nerlove et al. (1984) and Batina (1986) set out optimal taxation
frameworks in which the optimal child subsidy and income tax rates depend on the elasticity of the demand
for children, and how this elasticity varies with income.
3Women may have unobserved proclivities for diﬀerent family sizes. If diﬀerences in these proclivities
lead to diﬀerent human capital accumulation and marital decisions, then the opportunity cost of time out of
the labor market will be jointly determined with fertility. See, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980).
4Examples include Whittington et al. (1990), Hyatt and Milne (1991), Zhang et al. (1994), and Gauthier
and Hatzius (1997).
2identify fertility eﬀects of policy. Second, the assumptions about the timing of the response
to policy are arbitrary. Reactions to changes in fertility policy will be delayed by a nine-
month gestational lag, as well as any time necessary for the diﬀusion of information about the
change in policy. This makes it unclear which year’s policy inﬂuences which year’s fertility.
Finally, many of these time-series studies suﬀer from the common problem of short series
and the resulting small sample size. This reduces the credibility of asymptotic inferences.
Another large set of studies uses microdata to study the eﬀects of policy on fertility.
Whittington (1992) and Whittington (1993) ﬁnd a fertility-enhancing eﬀect of the dependent
exemption in the PSID. However, these studies are hampered by small sample sizes and
lack of substantial variation. The bulk of the recent literature, however, focuses on the
incentive eﬀects of payments through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
on female headship and fertility decisions.5 The surveys of this literature in Moﬃt (1998)
and Hoynes (1997b) both make a distinction between the ﬁndings of studies including state
ﬁxed eﬀects and those that do not. On the question of female headship, Moﬃtt (1994) and
Hoynes (1997a) provide evidence that the inclusion of state-level ﬁxed eﬀects wipes out the
explanatory power of welfare policy. If some unmeasured state-varying factor inﬂuences both
female headship and the determination of state AFDC rates, then excluding state ﬁxed eﬀects
from the regression will attribute to the policy what should be attributed to the excluded
variables. This leads Hoynes (1997b) to conclude that there is no compelling evidence of
a response to policy. For fertility, the Hoynes (1997b) survey reaches a similar conclusion.
Moﬃt (1998), on the other hand, interprets the evidence as being in favor of a relationship,
although without robustness. Harvey et al. (2000) survey the recent experimental literature
on welfare. They conclude that the “evaluations have produced inconsistent results” on the
relationship between family size and welfare beneﬁts.
More recently, Rosenzweig (1999) brings a diﬀerent approach to the estimation of AFDC
eﬀects on behavior. In his paper, the marital and child-bearing decisions of the woman are
modelled jointly, and estimated as a multinomial logit. This diﬀers from other models that
5AFDC was a transfer program for single parents with low income. Hoynes (1997b) describes the features
of AFDC in more detail. There is also some work on welfare and behavior in Canada. Allen (1993) ﬁnds
some eﬀect of welfare on fertility in a 1986 cross section of microdata. Dooley et al. (2000) study welfare
beneﬁts and female headship in Canada using provincial variation through time, ﬁnding no evidence of a
relationship.
3consider these decisions separately or sequentially. He uses diﬀerences in average welfare
beneﬁt levels across cohorts within states to identify the eﬀect of the beneﬁts. Rosenzweig
ﬁnds a signiﬁcant impact of AFDC in the decision of young women to be single mothers,
even with the inclusion of state-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
In this paper, I exploit the introduction of a pro-natalist tax policy in the Canadian
province of Quebec. The Allowance for Newborn Children paid up to C$8,000 to families
following the birth of a child. I implement a quasi-experimental empirical strategy using
microdata derived from the public-use ﬁles of the Canadian Census. The structure of the
Allowance for Newborn Children allows for the formation of treatment and control groups
deﬁned by time, jurisdiction, and family type. This strategy overcomes the problems in
the time-series literature described above, and oﬀers two improvements on ﬁndings from the
AFDC literature. First, the structure of the program allows for a triple diﬀerence estimator
that is robust to linear time-varying jurisdictional eﬀects. This strengthens the credibility
of causal inferences. In contrast, Rosenzweig (1999) relies on state eﬀects being constant to
identify the inﬂuence of AFDC. If changes through time in fertility patterns within states
have some inﬂuence on the decision to change AFDC rates, then estimates that rely on
across cohort variation will be biased. Second, because the program was available to all
families, the results are more general than those looking at AFDC payments alone. This
permits a broader examination of heterogeneity in the response to the program. Critically,
this provides an opportunity to ﬁnd a potential reconciliation of the results presented here
with the AFDC literature.
Several interesting ﬁndings emerge. First, the estimates suggest a strong, positive, and
robust impact of the policy on fertility. In the model containing the full set of control
variables, the fertility of those eligible for the new program is estimated to have increased
by 12 per cent on average, and by 25 per cent for those eligible for the maximum beneﬁt.
Second, I estimate the responsiveness of fertility to an extra $1,000 in beneﬁts, ﬁnding an
increase of 16.9 percent. Finally, I ﬁnd the response to the policy to be heterogeneous.
Subsamples of women similar to those used in AFDC studies show no statistically signiﬁcant
response to the incentives, while families with higher income show a stronger response.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I present a simple economic model of fertility to
develop the theoretical framework for the estimation that follows. I then provide details
4on the relevant institutions and describe the empirical strategy used in the analysis. Next,
I document trends in aggregate fertility using data derived from vital statistics, and then
proceed to a rigorous empirical examination using diﬀerent microdata sources, including
several checks for robustness of the result as well as an examination of heterogeneity in the
reaction to the program. The next section estimates the responsiveness of fertility to the
dollar value of beneﬁts. This is followed by a reconciliation of these results with the AFDC
literature. Finally, a brief discussion closes the paper.
2 The Model
Becker’s (1960) seminal article on the economics of fertility posits that parents make decisions
about children as they do other consumer goods — maximizing utility subject to prices and a
budget constraint. Willis (1973) synthesizes this approach with the theory of time allocation
developed in Becker (1965) to formalize the relationships between labor supply and fertility.
In his model, the presence of young children leads women to take time out of the labor
market. Women facing a higher opportunity cost of being absent from the labor market face
a higher price for children, and so will have fewer children.6 Below, I present a simple static
model of fertility in the presence of a per-unit transfer to families with children. This model
predicts that family size is increasing in the amount of child subsidy, which is the basic result
to be taken to the data.
This model is based on Becker’s (1991) model of fertility. A family utility function is
deﬁned over the consumption of two goods, the number of children Q, and a composite good
Z. The prices of the goods are pq for children, and 1 for the composite good, which is taken
as the numeraire. The family has income of I. The family receives a per-child subsidy of t,
meaning that the price faced by the family for the consumption of children is pq ¡ t. The
problem solved by the family is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint:
fQ;Zgmax U = U (Q;Z)
s:t: (pq ¡ t)Q + Z = I
6The development of both the theoretical and empirical literature is surveyed by Hotz et al. (1997).
5The ﬁrst-order conditions for the problem can be combined to give the standard condition
relating the marginal rate of substitution to relative prices.
UQ
UZ
= pq ¡ t




Holding income constant, an increase in the net price of children (pq ¡ t) leads to substitution
away from children to more consumption of the composite good. The demand for children
will be decreasing in the net price (increasing in the subsidy) so long as the income eﬀect is




Becker-type models of fertility are controversial among demographers. Olsen (1994) pro-
vides a discussion of the distinctions between this type of model and standard demographic
analysis, which places parents as actors within a system of exogenously given biological pro-
cesses, reproductive technology, and cultural inﬂuences. These models predict no change
in fertility decisions in reaction to exogenous changes in prices or incomes. So, evidence in
favor of a fertility reaction to price changes can be taken as supporting the prediction that
prices do matter against the alternative that prices are not important.
3 Empirical Strategy
I employ a quasi-experimental estimation strategy to explore the eﬀects of tax policy on
fertility. In this section, I ﬁrst give some background on the Allowance for Newborn Children.
This is followed by a discussion of the identifying assumptions used in the estimation strategy.
3.1 The Allowance for Newborn Children
Demography plays a unique role in the history of Quebec.7 Following the ceding of New
France to the British in 1763, the ﬂow of new French colonists ended. Very high birth rates
7There is an historical precedent for the Allowance for Newborn Children. In 1669, King Louis XIV of
France ordered that an annual stipend of 300 livres be paid to families with ten or more children (Langlois
(1993)).
6among French-Canadians allowed their numbers to grow from the original ten thousand
colonists to over one million by the time of the Canadian Census of 1871 (Langlois (1993)).
In 1959, fertility in Quebec fell below the Canadian average for the ﬁrst time.8 This trend
heightened concern about the preservation of French-Canadian culture and political inﬂu-
ence.9 These historical concerns contribute greatly to an explanation for the introduction of
the explicitly pro-natalist Allowance for Newborn Children.10
The Allowance for Newborn Children (ANC) paid non-taxable beneﬁts when a child
joined a family between May 1, 1988 and September 30, 1997.11 All citizens and permanent
residents of Quebec were eligible for this provincial program. The size of the ANC payment
depended on the parity (birth rank) of the child within the family. Initially in 1988, a ﬁrst
or second child entitled the family to a one-time $500 transfer. For a child of third or higher
parity, the government paid a series of eight quarterly payments of $375, totaling $3;000.
Over the next 4 years, the beneﬁt amounts increased. From 1992, the birth of a ﬁrst or
second child brought a $500 immediate payment. Second children also entitled the family
to a second $500 payment on the child’s ﬁrst birthday, and a third or higher parity child
brought twenty quarterly payments of $400, totaling $8;000. The ANC was cancelled in
1997.12
The introduction of the ANC was announced in the Quebec provincial budget on May 12,
1988. In the months preceding the budget, both the main opposition party and the governing
party included in their ﬁscal proposals some changes to Quebec’s family policies (Montreal
Gazette (1988ab)). However, the provincial government released no hints about the structure
of the ANC prior to the budget speech. The day following the release of the budget, the
ANC was front page news in both English and French newspapers in Quebec (Montreal
Gazette (1988c), La Presse (1988)). This suggests that the ANC is unlikely to have been
anticipated, but that information about its surprise introduction was plausibly wide-spread.
8Historical fertility rates for Quebec and Canada are presented and discussed in more detail in Section 4.
9See, for example, Gosselin (1968). Similar concerns about the “danger of submersion” into the English-
speaking population are expressed in Langlois (1933, p. 142).
10If so, this raises the possibility that both the policy and any changes in fertility share a common origin
— changes within Quebec society. I return to this point in the discussion of identiﬁcation that follows.
11Children born to the mother, as well as children under age ﬁve joining a family through adoption, were
eligible for the transfer. The beneﬁt did not depend on the mother’s marital status.
12Children born after September 30, 1997 were not entitled to the beneﬁt, although those born on or
before that date continued to receive the full stream of payments as scheduled until 2002.
7This enhances the credibility of setting this episode in an experimental framework.
The ANC was cancelled for children born after September 30, 1997. The cancellation
was announced well in advance, and again was well-publicized. As quoted in the Montreal
Gazette (1996), the government justiﬁed the cancellation by saying they thought the ANC
didn’t work.13 As a candidate for a quasi-experimental analysis, the cancellation is less than
ideal. A large expansion of public subsidies for daycare was announced at the same time as
the cancellation of the ANC.14 If daycare incentives had impact on fertility decisions, then
it is not clear that the absence of the ANC would lead to a fall in fertility. This potentially
contaminates the experimental environment.
Was the subsidy provided by the ANC large or small? To gain insight into this question,
I employ equivalence scales estimated by Phipps (1998). These scales measure the cost of
children by the extra income necessary to return the household to its pre-child level of utility.
So, this measure excludes the opportunity cost generated by any decrease in family labor
supply. I apply these scales to an average level of family income and obtain costs of $7;935
for a ﬁrst child, $6;348 for a second child, and $5;324 for a third child.15 Evaluated over the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of a child’s life, this implies that the ANC represented a percentage subsidy
to the direct costs of 1:3 per cent for a ﬁrst child, 3:2 per cent for a second child, and 30:1
per cent for a third child.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
Typically, quasi-experimental estimators compare the behavior of a treatment group and a
control group through a period in which an exogenous change aﬀects the economic environ-
ment of the treatment group.16 Here, Quebec women act as the treatment group, with the
women in the rest of Canada outside Quebec acting as the control group. The introduction of
the ANC provides the exogenous change. The diﬀerence in the fertility of women in Quebec
13The raw number of children born in Quebec in 1996 was almost unchanged from 1988 at about 85;000,
a fact which might underlie the government’s claim. When the number of babies is appropriately normalized
for the number and ages of women, a diﬀerent answer emerges. This is taken up further in Section 4.
14See Baril et al. (2000) for a description and analysis of the pre-1997 and post-1997 Quebec family beneﬁt
programs.
15The average total family income among married couples in the Census data set for 1996 is $51,191. (The
construction of this data set is described below in Section 5.1.) The equivalence scales estimated by Phipps
(1998) for a two parent family are 1.155 for one child, 1.279 for two children, and 1.383 for three children.
16See Meyer (1995) for a fuller description of this estimation strategy.
8before and after the introduction of the ANC can be compared to the diﬀerence in fertility of
women outside Quebec during the same period to form the standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator. In the literature on AFDC and fertility, jurisdictional ﬁxed eﬀects weaken the
estimates of the impact of AFDC, raising questions about identiﬁcation from cross-sectional
variation across jurisdictions. In contrast, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator eliminates
any additive jurisdictional ﬁxed eﬀects, and consequently does not rely on cross-sectional
inter-jurisdictional variation for identiﬁcation.
Heckman et al. (1999) describe the functional form assumptions necessary for the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimator to produce an unbiased estimate of the impact of a program. Specif-
ically, the impact of the program, jurisdictional ﬁxed eﬀects, and period eﬀects must be
additively separable in order for a diﬀerencing strategy to be unbiased. Furthermore, the
error terms must also be additively separable and their expected diﬀerence across groups
equal to zero. The assumption on the error terms will be violated if, for example, some
trend in a relevant unobserved characteristic aﬀects the economic environment in one juris-
diction diﬀerently than the other. In this case, the inﬂuence of the unobserved trend on the
outcome variable will be incorrectly attributed to the program.
I take three approaches to meeting the challenge presented by trends in other variables.
First, I attempt to do the best job possible with observables. The regressions include several
control variables for observable family characteristics that may inﬂuence fertility choices, as
well as some provincial-level controls for aggregate trends that may diﬀer across provinces.
Conditioning on these variables improves the credibility of causal inferences, but is not
suﬃcient in the presence of diﬀering trends in unobservables. The second approach exploits
the structure of the ANC to further reﬁne the empirical strategy. Because families giving
birth to higher parity children receive a larger allowance, their reaction to the program
should be stronger than the reaction of families contemplating the birth of a ﬁrst child. This
permits the construction of a third diﬀerence — women facing a ﬁrst-rank birth can act as
a control group for women considering a higher parity birth. This enhances the robustness
of the identiﬁcation strategy relative to the basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy. Finally, I
implement this triple-diﬀerencing strategy not only on the program’s introduction, but also
on its cancellation.
For families facing the birth of a ﬁrst child, the incentives provided by the ANC may be
9stronger than the beneﬁt paid for that child alone. This arises because the birth of a ﬁrst child
also gives the family an option to have a second child. In this way, the incentives for higher
parity births may inﬂuence families facing lower parity births. The use of families facing a
ﬁrst birth as a control group for families facing a third or higher birth is still informative,
however, so long as the treatment for the two groups is diﬀerent.17
This identiﬁcation strategy may be compromised if other policy changes occurred con-
temporaneous with the introduction of the Allowance for Newborn Children. Two major
changes during this time period present themselves. First, abortions were removed from the
Criminal Code of Canada following the striking down of Section 251 by the Supreme Court
of Canada in 1991.18 To the extent that this increased the availability of abortions, it may
have inﬂuenced fertility. The rate of abortion per 100 live births, however, showed little
change between 1986 and 1992.19 Second, the Canada-Quebec Accord of 1991 gave to the
province of Quebec constitutional power over immigration.20 If this resulted in a change in
the fertility behavior of immigrants selected by Quebec compared to those selected by the
rest of Canada, then my estimates will attribute to the ANC what should be attributed to
the change in immigration laws. To investigate this hypothesis, I reproduced the results
appearing in Section 5 with a subsample that excluded immigrants. There was no signiﬁcant
change to the point estimates.
The unique role of demography in Quebec society raises the question of policy endogene-
ity. Besley and Case (2000) argue that the source of policy variation must be considered
carefully. If some change in Quebec society lead to both the introduction of the program
and the change in fertility, then estimates of the eﬀect of the policy will be confounded. The
empirical approach taken here addresses this important issue in two ways. First, even in the
presence of a diﬀerent attitude to fertility among Quebecers, the identiﬁcation will be robust
if this attitude is constant through this period. Any ﬁxed Quebec-speciﬁc determinant of
17I ran regressions attempting to account for this option value by including a measure of the incentives for
the births of all potential higher parity children. The higher parity incentives were weighted by the probability
that the family would have a child of a given parity, conditional on the family’s current structure. These
regressions produced results similar to those reported.
18See the Supreme Court of Canada ruling R. v. Morgentaler (1991).
19See Statistics Canada (1994). The rate per 100 live births increased from 17.0 to 17.7 in all of Canada,
and from 14.7 to 16.6 in Quebec. The rates per one thousand women exhibited a similar pattern.
20See Young (1998) for details.
10fertility is controlled for in this empirical strategy by comparing the fertility of Quebecers
before and after the introduction of the ANC. Second, if there was some change in unob-
servable determinants of fertility in Quebec contemporaneous with the introduction of the
ANC, the triple-diﬀerence comparison of ﬁrst births to higher-order births permits inferences
about the eﬀects of the policy. In other words, a social trend would have to have a diﬀerential
impact on families of diﬀerent sizes in order to hinder inferences. Furthermore, an argument
relying on changes in social attitudes would not only have to explain the patterns of fertility
after the introduction of the policy, but also after its cancellation.
Bertrand et al. (2001) express concern about the possibility of a diﬀerencing identiﬁcation
strategy to ﬁnd eﬀects where there are none. I do three things to alleviate these concerns.
First, I look for pre-existing trends in fertility in each of the data sources analyzed here.
Second, I look for eﬀects in provinces where there was no incentive program. Finally, my
analysis with Census data will implement their suggestion to collapse data into one control
and one treatment period in order to avoid potential serial correlation of the policy variables.
I also explored the possibility of another control group, being non-residents (such as refugee
claimants) who were in Canada but not eligible for the ANC. However, the size of this group
was very small, and the comparability of unobservable characteristics for this group with
permanent residents is not likely to be adequate.
4 Evidence from Vital Statistics
This section examines aggregate measures of fertility taken from vital statistics.21 The
analysis aims to assess whether observed patterns of fertility are consistent with the ANC
having inﬂuenced fertility. The measure for fertility used here is the total fertility rate, which
takes the current cross-section of women and uses them to estimate the number of children
a typical woman will have during her lifetime.22 I ﬁrst look at the historic path of the total
21Vital statistics are collected by provincial governments. Statistics Canada collects some vital statistics
from the provincial oﬃces to provide national aggregate statistics. Along with these national statistics, I use
data collected from unpublished tables provided by the Ontario Oﬃce of the Registrar General, Institut de
la Statistique du Qu´ ebec, and Statistics Canada.
22The total fertility rate is calculated by taking the proportion of women ¼ of each age a who bear a child





11fertility rate in order to provide context for the experimental period. I then focus on the
years from 1980 to 2000, comparing fertility across jurisdiction and by parity, before and
after its introduction and cancellation. Finally, I present some aggregate evidence of fertility
behavior by cohort in order to look at the dynamics of childbearing.
Figure 1 graphs the historic path of the total fertility rate of women in Quebec and
Canada before the ANC from 1922 to 1991.23 The fertility of women in Quebec exceeded
the Canadian average prior to 1959. From 1959 to 1974, fertility dropped sharply across
Canada, going from 3.94 to 1.88, while the decline in Quebec was slightly greater, going
from 3.93 to 1.61. From 1975 to 1979, Quebec fertility increased relative to the Canadian
average, then fell again through the 1980s. The 1970s relative increase in Quebec fertility
coincides with reforms to the federal family allowance in 1974 and 1978.24
In order to focus more closely on the period encompassing the introduction of the ANC,
I construct annual total fertility rates for Quebec and for the rest of Canada excluding
Quebec.25 For comparison, I also include the total fertility rate for the United States in each
year. These data are graphed in Figure 2. From 1980 to 1987, the total fertility rates in
Quebec and the rest of Canada diverged, reaching a maximum diﬀerence of 0.290 in 1987.
The period after the introduction of the ANC shows a quick narrowing of the gap between
the total fertility rates of Quebec and the rest of Canada. By 1991 this gap reached 0.082,
and then remained fairly constant through the duration of the program. This provides some
preliminary evidence consistent with the ANC having aﬀected fertility.
Following the cancellation of the program in 1997, the total fertility rate in Quebec fell
(In practice, the total fertility rate is typically calculated using ﬁve-year age groups.) An alternative
measure, the completed fertility rate, measures the total number of children borne by women of cohorts
who have completed their fertile period. Since few women exposed to the ANC have completed their fertile
period, this measure is not useful for the present question. Campbell (1983) addresses the construction of
demographic measures. Hotz et al. (1997) provide a detailed discussion comparing period and completed
fertility measures.
23The Canada total fertility rate does not include Newfoundland because data for Newfoundland is not
available for the whole period.
24The federal family allowance, the structure of which varies by province, was expanded signiﬁcantly in
1974. In Quebec, the federal entitlement depended on the number of children in the family, with third and
fourth children receiving 133 and 158 per cent more than the amount payable to a ﬁrst child. In 1979, the
family allowance was partially replaced by an income-tested refundable tax credit. More detail is provided
in Appendix D.
25The construction of these total fertility rates is discussed in Appendix A. Data for Quebec is available
up to 2000. National data is available currently only to 1998.
12from 1.601 in 1996 to 1.429 in 2000. In the rest of Canada, there was also a downward
trend from 1996 to 1998, though not as sharp as in Quebec. While caution should be taken
in the interpretation of so few data points, it appears that fertility in Quebec and the rest
of Canada moved in directions consistent with the cancellation of the ANC having had an
eﬀect.
Figure 3 breaks down the total fertility rate by parity. These fertility rates are analo-
gous to the total fertility rate, but concentrate on speciﬁc births. The magnitudes can be
interpreted as the proportion of women who will have a birth of a speciﬁc parity during her
lifetime, using the behavior of the current cross-section of women. First, at the top of the
ﬁgure the fertility rates of women having their ﬁrst child are graphed. The rate for women
in Quebec lies below the rate for women in the rest of Canada for the pre-reform period.
After the introduction of the ANC, the fertility rate of women in Quebec rises relative to
women in the rest of Canada until 1991, when it overtakes the rate for the rest of Canada.
For second children, the same pattern emerges: a persistent gap before the reform followed
by a period of convergence from the introduction of the ANC until 1991, and then ﬁnally a
period with little diﬀerence between the rates from 1991 to 1997. The bottom two lines in
Figure 3 compare the fertility rate for the two regions for births of third or higher parity.
The gap between the rates before the introduction of the ANC was substantial. The rate
was 0.217 in Quebec compared to 0.374 in the rest of Canada for 1987, for example. After
the introduction of the ANC, the fertility rate for third or higher births in Quebec increased
rapidly. In 1995, the Quebec rate reached 0.305, which was 41% above the rate observed in
1987. Over the same period, the fertility rate in the rest of Canada displayed a steady, slow
downward trend.
In the period following the cancellation of the ANC, the trends in the parity-speciﬁc
fertility rates again correspond with the hypothesis that the ANC aﬀected fertility. Between
1996 (the last full year of the program) and 2000, the fertility rate for third or higher births
dropped from 0.303 to 0.248 — a drop of 18 per cent. In the rest of Canada between 1996
and 1998 there was a decrease of only three per cent.
Overall, this breakdown of the total fertility rate by parity provides two strong pieces of
evidence. First, the ANC appears to have had an eﬀect on fertility rates in Quebec, both
on its introduction and its cancellation. Second, the movements in births of third or higher
13parity appear to be larger than those for births of ﬁrst or second parity, consistent with the
magnitude of the incentives.
Do these observed changes in fertility represent a permanent or a transitory shift in
fertility behavior?26 For example, if woman reacted to the ANC by having more children
earlier, followed by fewer children later in life, then there would be no eﬀect of the ANC
on completed fertility. However, the measured total fertility rate would reﬂect this with a
transitory upward shift.27 When completed fertility rates for the cohorts exposed to the
ANC become available, this hypothesis may be testable. Still, with currently available data,
some evidence can be gathered on this question. If a cohort of women exposed to the ANC
is observed to shift births to earlier ages, then this would provide evidence of the observed
shift in the measured total fertility rate being transitory.
Table 1 reports the number of children born to each one thousand women in Quebec in
diﬀerent age ranges by cohort. The data are presented at ﬁve-year intervals between 1962
and 1997. The rates from 1992 and 1997 are shaded to indicate the presence of the ANC
for those years. The top-left cell takes the women born between 1943 and 1947 for the year
1962, when members of this cohort were between the ages of 15 and 19. For these women,
there were 29.83 births per thousand women in 1962. The top row then follows this cohort
through to 1987, when they had 2.59 children per thousand. Looking down the ﬁrst column
allows a comparison of diﬀerent cohorts as they reach the 15 to 19 age range.
This table is informative when read along either dimension. First, looking down each
column, there is a downward trend in fertility in each age range among newer cohorts until
the introduction of the ANC. For example, women born between 1943 and 1947 had 68.13
children per thousand in 1977 when aged 30 to 34. The cohort of women born ten years later
had only 59.95. Following the introduction of the ANC, women in this age range show higher
fertility, at 80.89 in 1992 and 79.61 in 1997. Looking across diﬀerent rows, any intertemporal
shifting of fertility can be seen. For example, the cohort of women born between 1963 and
1967 increased their fertility when exposed to the ANC between the ages of 25 and 29 relative
26Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) explore life cycle fertility behavior.
Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) examine the role of taxes and the timing of birth within a pregnancy.
27Hotz et al. (1997) demonstrate how shifts in the timing of births are exaggerated when a period fertility
measure such as the total fertility rate is used. Heckman and Walker (1990) estimate a model of the timing
and spacing of births using Swedish data. Merrigan and St.Pierre (1998) use a similar methodology on
Canadian data.
14to earlier cohorts not exposed to the ANC. When this same cohort of women was between
the ages of 30 and 34 in 1997, they had 79.61 children per thousand, which exceeded the
fertility of older cohorts in that age range. So, increases in fertility observed in 1992 do not
appear to be oﬀset by later decreases in fertility in 1997 when the same cohort of women
were older. This provides some evidence against a transitory reaction to the ANC.
To summarize this evidence, aggregate fertility rates in Quebec and the rest of Canada
move in a direction consistent with the ANC having an impact on women’s fertility decisions.
This reaction appears for births of all parities, but most noticeably for births of children
of third or higher parities. This is consistent with the incentive structure of the beneﬁts
under the ANC. Finally, the pattern of increased fertility in Quebec during the reform
period appears persistently through all ages for the observed cohorts, which provides some
preliminary evidence against a transitory reaction to the program. These inferences, however,
may be contaminated by trends in other factors inﬂuencing fertility that diﬀer between
Quebec and the rest of Canada. The next section expands the analysis to a framework
using microdata, in which controls for observable household characteristics and province-
wide trends can be incorporated.
5 Evidence from Census Data
The primary data set employed for the analysis is selected from the Canadian 1991 and 1996
Census Public Use Microdata Files on Families.28 Combined in this way, the data set is
a repeated cross-section rather than a longitudinal sample.29 The Census microdata ﬁles
combine information on the family recorded on Census Day with income and labor force
information from the previous calendar year. The 1991 ﬁle describes each family as of June
4, 1991 and provides income details for 1990. Similarly, the 1996 ﬁle describes the families
as of May 14, 1996, and provides income details for the 1995 tax year.30
28I also explored the Family Expenditure Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finance, and the General Social
Survey as possible data sources. In all cases, the sample size for women in Quebec of diﬀerent family types
was insuﬃcient to provide credible inferences.
29Heckman et al. (1999) and Heckman and Robb (1985) show that under fairly general conditions repeated
cross sections estimate the same parameter as panel data.
30Using the 1986 Census in place of the 1991 Census was explored as well. Implementing a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences strategy over a longer period may contaminate the diﬀerences through trends in unobservables.
In particular, the 1986 Census covers a period of substantial population outﬂow from Quebec, which may
15Two obvious weaknesses of the Census data used here are the frequency of the data and
the inability to examine the cancellation of the program. The Census is taken quinquennially,
and the 2001 Census ﬁles are not yet available. Both of these weaknesses, however, can be
addressed in part by examining data from the Labour Force Survey. I take up this analysis
in Section 6. For the main analysis, however, the Census is preferable because of the depth
of information about the demographic and income situation of each household.
For the analysis with the Census data in this section, I ﬁrst outline the selection criteria
used to choose the families included in the analysis. Next, I describe the construction of
the variables used from those available in the Census. Finally, I present some descriptive
statistics for the full sample, as well as subsamples consisting of families from Quebec and
from the rest of Canada.
5.1 Data Set Construction
The 1991 and 1996 ﬁles report information on a sample of 345,351 and 342,231 families
respectively. Each is roughly a three per cent sample of the population. To create the data
set used in the analysis, I ﬁrst select only families in which the female spouse or lone-parent
female is between age 15 and 34. Women older than 34 are increasingly likely to have children
who have left the household, which makes the family structure diﬃcult to reconstruct. This
left 160,901 families in the data set. Additionally, there are 20,749 families who moved
between provinces in the ﬁve years prior to Census day. These families are removed to
improve accuracy in assigning the province of residence at the time the family had their
children.31 In some cases, the reported number of children is censored, so the exact family
structure could not be constructed. Three hundred and sixteen such families are identiﬁed
and removed from the data set. Finally, 2,951 families in the remaining sample are non-
residents, making them ineligible for the receipt of the ANC or other family tax beneﬁts.
have aﬀected fertility rates if those leaving had diﬀerent fertility characteristics than those who stayed. (See
Lachapelle (1987) for a discussion of the eﬀects of this migration.) Regressions using the 1986 Census in place
of the 1991 Census show similar results for the core diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results, but weaker evidence for
the triple-diﬀerence results.
31Mobile households are of course important if mobility was inﬂuenced by child beneﬁt policy. Because the
Census does not report the previous province of residence nor the year when the move took place, this issue
is diﬃcult to address with these data. In regressions with this sample of mobile households, no diﬀerence in
behavior relative to non-mobile households is observed.
16The ﬁnal data set contains 136,885 observations.
The timing of the Censuses and the ANC is critical to the interpretation of the empirical
results. The Census ﬁles do not provide the exact year of birth for each child, but do report
the number of children in diﬀerent age ranges. The ﬁrst category is for children under the
age of six. For the 1991 Census, a child born between June 5, 1985 and June 4, 1991 will
appear as a child under the age of six. These dates deﬁne what I refer to as the 1991 Census
window. Similarly, the 1996 Census window opens on May 15, 1990 and closes on May 14,
1996. The ANC was paid for children born between May 1, 1988 and September 30, 1997.
The ANC window thus partially overlaps the 1991 Census window, but completely spans
the 1996 Census window. Figure 4 displays the timing graphically.32
Because of gestation and information lags, it is diﬃcult to know exactly when the ﬁrst
births potentially inﬂuenced by the ANC took place. The degree to which births observed
in the 1991 Census were inﬂuenced by the ANC changes the interpretation of the results. If
no births observed in the 1991 Census were inﬂuenced by the ANC, then the research design
is standard — one pre-treatment period followed by one full treatment period. Because of
the overlap, however, the use of these two Censuses results in a comparison of fertility in a
period of partial exposure to the ANC (the 1991 Census window) with fertility in a period
with complete exposure to the ANC (the 1996 Census window).33
The “windows” methodology is similar to that of Rosenzweig (1999), who uses as an
incentive variable the average welfare rates faced by women over the years until turning
22. Rosenzweig argues that it is more reasonable to assume that women react to average
diﬀerences in policy rather than postulate that fertility moves exactly contemporaneously
with policy. Results using a smaller three-year window can be formed with the Labour Force
Survey, which reports the age of the youngest child in a category for children under age
three. Analysis on these data appears in section 6.
This experimental design requires knowledge of the family structure at the beginning of
32From the ages of the mother and children reported in the 1995 General Social Survey, I constructed
yearly observations on the fertility behavior of each mother. Using this data set, I could exploit the year
to year changes in the ANC to identify the policy eﬀects. Regressions on this data set showed positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects of the ANC on fertility. However, reported household income in the GSS is unreliable.
This and the small sample size limit the usefulness of this data set for a deeper analysis.
33In Appendix C, I report results from regressions using the dollar values of child beneﬁts. This will
account for the intensity of treatment received by women through each Census window.
17the Census window six years prior to Census day, as well as the exact number of children
born to the family over the Census window. The Census reports the number of children in
diﬀerent age ranges residing with the family on Census day. The category for children under
age six is used to construct the binary variable Had a child, taking the value 1 when the
family has at least one child under six, and 0 if no children under age six are present. From
the other age categories, I construct three indicator variables to count the number of children
age six or older in the family. The variables Zero older children, One older child, and Two
or more older children take the value 1 when the corresponding number of children over six
are present in the household, and 0 otherwise. These variables enable the reconstruction of
the family structure at the beginning of the Census window. The number of older children
is the number of children the family had as it entered the Census window. The variable Had
a child captures whether or not the family responded to the incentives they faced, given the
number of children already in the family as it entered the Census window.
The reconstruction of the family structure is inexact. Children present at the beginning
of the Census window may not be with the family on Census day. Similarly, children present
on Census day may not have been present during the Census window. These discrepancies
may result from events such as the death of a child, divorce, remarriage, or the adoption of
an older child. The 1991 Census provides an opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of this
reconstruction, since the ﬁle in that year reports how many children had ever been born
to the female. Of the 74,400 families in the 1991 sample, 92.9 per cent show no diﬀerence
between the number of children ever born to the female and the number of children currently
in the household.34
Several other family characteristics observable in the data set may inﬂuence fertility.
Controls for the age, highest education level, mother tongue, and immigration status of both
the woman and her spouse are created from the reported categories in the Census.35 In
addition, three controls for province-wide factors are created and attached to each family
based on the province of residence. Controlling for the family’s income presents several diﬃ-
culties. A great amount of evidence documents a drop in female labor market activity upon
34The family reconstruction for the excluded women in the age range 35 to 44 was successful in only 76.4
per cent of the cases.
35Further detail on the construction of all variables is provided in Appendix A.
18the birth of a child.36 Furthermore, transfers from government through family allowances
and unemployment insurance payments may rise with the birth of a child, creating a similar
endogeneity problem through the tax and transfer system. To overcome these problems, I
construct a measure of family income that includes only male labor market earnings and
family non-labor income. The body of empirical evidence suggests that these components
of income are not responsive to family size. Ideally, I would include the annual income for
each year of the Census window. The Census, however, reports only the income for the
year preceding the year of the Census (1995 for the 1996 Census; 1990 for the 1991 Census).
Therefore, the family income variable I create acts as a proxy for the income received by the
family during the Census window.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the sample. For each of 1991 and 1996,
the mean values for variables are reported for all observations, for those residing in Quebec,
and for those residing in the rest of Canada. If assignment to treatment were randomized,
the expected value of all characteristics would be equal across the treatment and control
groups.37 Because treatment was assigned by geography rather than by randomization, it
is important to examine the diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups. The
number of observations fell from 1991 to 1996, reﬂecting the smaller share of the population
in the 15 to 34 age range in the later Census. The proportion of women with a child under
six rose from 0.428 in 1991 to 0.444 in 1996. The increase in Quebec, however, was greater
— from 0.418 to 0.451 compared to an increase of 0.432 to 0.441 in the rest of Canada.
These comparisons are given a more thorough examination in the next section.
Changes in other observable characteristics may explain some of the changes in fertility
in Quebec and the rest of Canada. For example, families in the 1996 sample attained higher
education levels than families in the 1991 sample. The proportion of women with a university
degree increased by 48.8 per cent in Quebec and 27.1 per cent in the rest of Canada. If women
with more education have a higher opportunity cost of an absence from the labor force, then
controlling for this diﬀerence between Quebec and the rest of Canada may become important.
The proportion of married women in the sample decreased from 0.713 in 1991 to 0.683 in
36See, for example, Angrist and Evans (1998), or Gunderson (1998) for Canadian evidence.
37Randomized experiments do not necessarily eliminate bias. Heckman and Smith (1995) argue that both
experimental and non-experimental evaluations face the same challenge — making inferences about the
intrinsically unobservable behavior of the treatment group had it not received treatment.
191996, but this drop occurs almost equally in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Average family
incomes dropped sharply from $24,749 in the 1991 sample to $21,593 in the 1996 sample,
although once again there is not a large diﬀerence between Quebec and the rest of Canada.
The change in the average provincial GDP growth does not diﬀer greatly between Quebec
and the rest of Canada. The net migration rate doubles between 1991 and 1996 in both
Quebec and the rest of Canada, reﬂecting the increase in immigration through this period.
Average provincial education spending per student grew by eight per cent in the rest of
Canada, but only by one per cent in Quebec. Because changes in GDP growth, migration,
and education spending occur simultaneously with the ANC, including these variables as
controls will remove any eﬀect of these provincial-level shocks on fertility from the measured
impact of the ANC.
5.2 Diﬀerences in Means
Table 3 presents a comparison of the means of the indicator variable Had a child across time,
jurisdiction, and parity. The standard deviations appear below the corresponding means.
The table ﬁrst compares the means using the full sample, then breaks down the sample by
parity. The ﬁrst two columns report the means from the 1991 and the 1996 sample. The
third column takes the diﬀerence between these means across time to calculate the trend in
the means, while the fourth column takes the diﬀerence in the trend diﬀerences. The ﬁfth
column then reports the percentage increase in fertility in Quebec from 1991 to 1996. This
is calculated by comparing the observed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences to a counterfactual case in
which the Quebec trend was equal to the rest of Canada trend. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
is divided by the sum of the 1991 Quebec mean and the 1996 rest of Canada trend. Finally,
the last column takes the diﬀerence between the result for ﬁrst and third children to form
the triple-diﬀerence.
Panel A analyzes the full sample. In Quebec, the proportion of women with a child
under six increased by 0.033 from 1991 to 1996. The trend in the rest of Canada was 0.009.
The diﬀerence in these diﬀerences is a signiﬁcant 2.4 percentage points, which represents
a 5.5 per cent increase over the counterfactual assumption that Quebec fertility followed
the same trend as the rest of Canada. Panels B through D repeat these calculations for
subsamples of women having zero, one, and two or more other children respectively. This
20approach leads to the triple-diﬀerence strategy described earlier. In panel B, the percentage
increase in the proportion of women with zero older children who had a child is 4.0 per
cent. For those with one, and two or more older children, this rises to 9.7 per cent and 17.2
per cent. These percentage increases change monotonically with parity, which is consistent
with the beneﬁt structure of the ANC. A more formal test of the triple-diﬀerence result is
presented in the sixth column of the table. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for families with no
other children is subtracted from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for families with two or more
other children. This tests whether the percentage point change in the probability of having
a child is equal across parities. Because the base probabilities are very diﬀerent, the same
percentage point change represents a diﬀerent percentage change in the probability of having
a ﬁrst child versus the probability of having a third child. The calculated triple-diﬀerence
is 0.036 percentage points. The corresponding p-value from the test of the hypothesis that
this triple-diﬀerence mean is diﬀerent from zero is 0.076.
The diﬀerences in means present compelling initial evidence of the eﬀect of the ANC on
fertility. These statistics show that fertility increased in Quebec between 1991 and 1996,
and that this increase was stronger for births of higher parity. While this is consistent with
the ANC having an eﬀect on fertility, this preliminary evidence is insuﬃcient to suggest
causation. For example, other variables important for a family’s fertility decisions may
vary systematically across time, place, and parity. A multivariate framework that features
controls for observable characteristics therefore improves the credibility of causal inferences.
5.3 Basic Regressions
The sample statistics presented in Table 2 revealed several diﬀerences between Quebec and
the rest of Canada for variables potentially aﬀecting fertility. In this section, I report results
from regressions controlling linearly for demographic and provincial variables. This improves
on the simple mean diﬀerences of the previous section by removing from the estimated pro-
gram eﬀect the inﬂuence of other observable variables aﬀecting fertility. I ﬁrst run regressions
looking for the existence of a diﬀerential fertility rate in Quebec in 1996. Following this, I
explore how this response changes among families facing the birth of children of diﬀerent
parities. The estimates reveal that the statistical signiﬁcance of the increase in fertility in
Quebec persists with the inclusion of linear controls for observable characteristics.
21The equation to be estimated takes the following form:
Had a childi = ¯0 + ¯1Quebeci ¤ 1996 dummyi + ¯2Quebeci + ¯31996 dummyi + ¯
0
4Xi + ei
All speciﬁcations share the same independent variable (Had a child), and include controls
for 1996 and Quebec ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as a constant. This corresponds to a typical
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences empirical speciﬁcation by controlling for both Quebec and temporal
ﬁxed eﬀects. The variable of interest is the interaction between Quebec and 1996 dummy.
This interaction picks up any diﬀerential trends in fertility among residents of Quebec rela-
tive to those in the rest of Canada. The variables included in Xi vary by speciﬁcation. All
models are estimated as probits, with standard errors derived from the Huber-White robust
estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. The reported estimates are marginal proba-
bilities for each of the included independent variables. These estimates can be interpreted
as the marginal change in the probability of having a child during the Census window for a
change in the corresponding independent variable.
Table 4 presents regression results including diﬀerent combinations of regressors. The
ﬁrst column displays the results from a regression including only Quebec, 1996 dummy, and
their interaction. Without other control variables, the interaction term provides a measure of
the unconditional average diﬀerence in fertility in Quebec in 1996. The marginal probability
implied by the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term is 0.024. As expected, this is
the same as the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of the treatment eﬀect reported in Table 3.
Given that the proportion of women with a child under six in Quebec in 1991 was 0.418, and
the estimated marginal probability from the 1996 trend variable is 0.009, the 0.024 estimate
therefore implies a 5.6 per cent increase in the probability of having a child for women in
Quebec in 1996.
The second column expands the set of regressors to include controls for several charac-
teristics of the mother. With these variables included, the implied percentage increase in the
probability of having a child is 7.8 per cent. These estimates suggest that the increase in
fertility in Quebec in the previous speciﬁcations was not due to diﬀerences in family struc-
ture, age, immigrant status, mother tongue, or education level of the women in the sample.
I control for the number of children at the beginning of the Census window with dummy
variables. Also included are controls for the age, immigrant status, mother tongue, and ed-
22ucation level of the woman. The marginal probability of 0.205 reported for One older child
suggests that families who have already had one child have a 20.5 percentage point higher
probability of having another child, relative to families with no older children. (The dummy
variable No older children is the excluded variable.) Families with two or more children
already, however, are less likely to have another child, as indicated by the negative marginal
probability reported for the corresponding indicator variable. Taken together, this reveals
an average preference for two child families.
The demographic controls reveal no surprises. The excluded age category is for ages 15
to 24. Relative to the excluded category, the estimates suggest that females age 25 to 34
are 18.7 percentage points more likely to have a child. I include a dummy for immigrant
status as well as dummies for the mother tongue spoken by the woman. These variables
may capture cultural elements that vary across native-born and immigrant women, and
across women of diﬀerent language groups. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on being anglophone
or francophone suggests that, relative to allophones, both anglophones and francophones are
less likely to give birth in the Census window. Finally, three dummy variables indicate the
eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of female education on fertility. The estimates decline monotonically
with education. For a women with a university degree, the estimated coeﬃcient implies a
19.2 percentage point drop in the probability of having a child. Women with more education
have better labor market prospects, so this pattern is consistent with the predictions of the
Willis (1973) framework in which women with a higher opportunity cost of time choose to
have fewer children.
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) and Rosenzweig (1999) have argued that human capital
accumulation decisions are made jointly with fertility decisions. For example, if a young
woman has little desire to bear children, then this may increase her propensity to make
investments in human capital. In addition, this may increase her desire to get married. This
suggests caution in interpreting the coeﬃcients on these potentially endogenous variables.
How might this eﬀect the estimate of the program’s impact on fertility? If women changed
their human capital and marital decisions in response to the introduction of the ANC, then
interpreting these variables separately from the Quebec - 1996 dummy interaction becomes
diﬃcult. However, because many of the women in this data set were older when the program
was introduced, it seems plausible to assume their marital and education choices were ﬁxed
23before they were exposed to the program.38
The third column adds further control variables for the male partners of the women in
the sample. The estimated coeﬃcient on the Quebec - 1996 dummy interaction increases
to 3.9 percentage points with the male controls included. The estimated coeﬃcients on
the education variables show a distinctly opposite pattern for the males. If males do not
take time out of the labor force upon the birth of a child, then male earning potential has
an income eﬀect on fertility. Therefore, these estimates suggest a positive income eﬀect
on fertility. Additional evidence on the income eﬀect on fertility is found in the estimated
coeﬃcient on Family income, a measure which excludes the labor market earnings of the
female. This coeﬃcient is positive, suggesting that a ten thousand dollar increase in family
income increases the probability of having a child by 1.75 percentage points. In the Becker
and Lewis (1973) quality-quantity model, more income leads to a higher demand for both
child quality and child quantity, which leaves the sign of the overall income eﬀect theoretically
ambiguous.39 In these data, the estimates suggest that, on average, the direct eﬀect of higher
income on the quantity of children dominates the indirect eﬀect through child quality.
The fourth column of Table 4 supplements the controls from column 3 with three addi-
tional provincial control variables, as well as provincial ﬁxed eﬀects. The interpretation of
the Quebec and 1996 dummy interaction as a program eﬀect relies on the assumed absence
of other provincial trends in variables aﬀecting fertility. Provincial GDP growth, Provin-
cial migration rate, and Provincial education spending attempt to control for province-level
macroeconomic, demographic, or ﬁscal shocks that may confound the measurement of the
eﬀect of the ANC. While only one of these estimates is statistically signiﬁcant in itself, the
three are strongly signiﬁcant when tested jointly, with a calculated chi-squared test statis-
tic of 15.51 for the exclusion of these three variables. These controls have a large impact
on the estimate of the Quebec - 1996 dummy interaction term, which rises from 3.9 to 5.3
percentage points.
In the discussion of identiﬁcation in Section 3, the possibility of ﬁnding “false” treatment
38Regressions on the subsample of women between the ages of 25 and 34, for whom this assumption may
be more reasonable, show similar results to the full sample.
39The increase in desired child quality induced by the increase in income leads to an increase in the
expenditure per child. This increases the cost of a child, which leads to a decreases in the desired quantity.
Thus, higher income has a positive direct eﬀect on quantity, but a negative indirect eﬀect on quantity through
child quality.
24eﬀects was raised. To investigate this issue, I conducted a number of falsiﬁcation checks by
looking for fertility eﬀects in provinces and in time periods when there was no ANC program.
These results are presented in Appendix B. Overall, no other situations arise with fertility
patterns similar to those experienced by Quebec during this period.
5.4 Results for Diﬀerent Family Structures
The evidence presented in Table 4 shows a strong increase in fertility in Quebec following
the introduction of the ANC. In order to provide more convincing evidence of a causal link,
I present results that compare the fertility of families facing the birth of children of diﬀerent
parities. With the higher payment made to births of third or higher parity, a stronger
response by these families is expected.
Table 5 reports the results of regressions on three subsamples comprised of families with
zero, one, and two or more older children. These results appear in the ﬁrst three columns
of the table. These regressions use the empirical speciﬁcation from Table 4 including the
full set of control variables. For families who entered the Census window with no children,
the estimated increase in the probability of having a child is 4.1 percentage points, which
implies a 9.8 per cent increase in probability over the counterfactual assumption that Quebec
followed the same trend as the rest of Canada. For second children, the percentage increase
in probability is 13.1 per cent, and for third or higher parity children, the probability is
estimated to increase by 24.7 per cent over its counterfactual level. All three estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This larger increase in the fertility of families
facing the birth of a higher-parity child is consistent with the pattern of the incentives of
the ANC.
Families facing the birth of a third child may diﬀer systematically from other families in
other observable ways. For example, women who already have at least two children are older
and have higher family income. To see if it is these diﬀerences rather than the ANC that
underlie the stronger response among families facing higher-parity births, I pool together all
family types, but now interact the Quebec and 1996 dummy variable with each of Zero older
children, One older child, and Two or more older children. As well, I include interactions of
Quebec with each family type, and interactions of 1996 dummy with each family type. This
controls for any Quebec-speciﬁc eﬀects for children of diﬀerent parities, and common trends
25in fertility for families with children of diﬀerent parities. This speciﬁcation frees diﬀerent
family types to have diﬀerent responses to the program, while controlling for observable
diﬀerences across family types. The resulting estimates are quite similar to those from the
regressions on family-type subsamples. The implied percentage increase in the probability
ranges from 10.7 per cent for families with zero older children to 25.0 per cent for families
with two or more older children. This again follows the pattern predicted by the incentive
structure of the ANC.
5.5 Results Using Dollar Value of ANC Beneﬁts
This section discusses results from regressions that replace the Quebec - 1996 dummy in-
teraction with the dollar values of ANC beneﬁts received by families. Such a speciﬁcation
accounts for the intensity of treatment received by diﬀerent families. The analysis is made
diﬃcult, however, by the frequency of receipt of payments. Estimates from the existing lit-
erature tend to use annual beneﬁt ﬂows rather than lump-sum payments. For this reason, to
try and maintain comparability I report results from regressions using two measures of the
beneﬁt — the ﬂow of beneﬁts over the ﬁrst year of the child’s life and the ﬂow of beneﬁts
over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the child’s life. More detail on the calculations can be found in
Appendix C and Appendix D.
Table 6 presents the coeﬃcients from regressions using the same control variables as
Table 4 column (d) along with the ﬁrst-year and the ﬁve-year ANC beneﬁt amounts. The
ﬁrst column contains the results for the ﬁrst-year beneﬁt regression. This regression provides
a useful comparison with results from the literature which focus on annual beneﬁts. The
estimated coeﬃcient on the beneﬁt variable is 0.073. This coeﬃcient implies that a $1,000
increase in the beneﬁts received in the ﬁrst year would increase the probability of having
a child by 16.9 per cent. When this responsiveness is combined with the average beneﬁt
received by Quebecers, the beneﬁt elasticity of fertility can be calculated. The elasticity
here is 0.107, which is similar to the range of estimates in time-series studies.40
The second column of the table displays the ﬁve-year beneﬁt results. This measure
40Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) ﬁnd a long run beneﬁt elasticity of 0.16 for family allowances across coun-
tries. Zhang et al. (1994) ﬁnd elasticities of 0.05 to 0.11 for child beneﬁts in Canada. Whittington et al.
(1990) ﬁnd elasticities between 0.127 and 0.248 for the personal exemption in the United States.
26better captures the change in the family’s ﬁnancial position because of the diﬀering number
of periods over which payments were made for the ANC. Here, the estimate suggests that a
$1,000 increase in the total ﬁve-year sum of the beneﬁts would increase fertility by 2.6 per
cent. This is only slightly less than one ﬁfth of the ﬁrst-year beneﬁt result, which suggests
that using the ﬁrst-year beneﬁts proxies satisfactorily for future beneﬁt ﬂows.
Families in Quebec and in the rest of Canada were eligible for many other beneﬁts through
the tax system in addition to the ANC. Appendix C explores the total tax beneﬁts received
by families with children, ﬁnding results very similar to those presented above using only
the ANC.
6 Evidence from the Labour Force Survey
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) overcomes two weaknesses of the Census data — its fre-
quency and the inability to examine the cancellation of the ANC. This section provides a
brief supplementary analysis using the LFS to address each of these questions.41
The LFS is a monthly survey of around 50,000 households, similar in many respects to
the U.S. Current Population Survey. It combines questions on labor market activities with
demographic characteristics of the household.42 Three key variables permit the construction
of family structure. First, information on the marital status of the household is reported.
Second, the number of members in the family is provided. Finally, the data include the age
of the youngest child (if there is a child). The ﬁrst category for the youngest child is for ages
less than three, so the window used for analysis here is only three years, compared to the
six year window used in the analysis of the Census.43 Married families and lone-parent or
unattached females are included in the sample if the female is between the ages of 15 and
34. The average sample size for each year is around 260,059, of which about 42,022 are from
Quebec.
41The motivation for this section borrows from an Honours research paper by Andrea Wenham.
42The survey is a nationally representative sample of the population of the ten provinces aged 15 and
higher. Residents of the territories, inmates of institutions, residents living on Indian Reserves, and military
personnel are excluded. I use the sample weights provided.
43The marital status is taken from the variable reporting the type of economic family rather than the
marital status variable, as the marital status variable appeared inconsistent through time. Families classiﬁed
as “other family types” were excluded because of the diﬃculty in assigning family structure.
27One weakness compared to the Census is that the LFS reports only the age of the
youngest child, rather than the number of children in the under age three category. This
means that families who had multiple children during the three year window will erroneously
be assigned too large a family structure at the beginning of the window.44 This will aﬀect any
inferences made about the parity-speciﬁc patterns of fertility in the LFS, as more families
will be assumed to have faced the higher incentive levels than was actually the case. This
will bias down the results for those with one and those with two or more children. As with
the Census data, a variable Had a child is constructed that takes the value 1 if the family
has a child age three or less, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 5 displays the mean of the LFS Had a child variable both for all families and for
families who had two or more older children at the beginning of the window. Separate lines
are drawn for residents of Quebec and those in the Rest of Canada. Note that this variable
represents a three year moving average of fertility, rather than a true indicator of fertility
for each year. For example, the 1996 value for Had a child will reﬂect children born in 1993
through 1996, and possibly conceived as far back as 1992. Again, a line is drawn in at 1988
and at 1997 to indicate the beginning and the end of the ANC incentives.
The trends in fertility evident in Figure 5 are broadly consistent with the patterns ex-
pected with the introduction and cancellation of the ANC. For the results with all families,
there is a clear increase in fertility following 1988 which is sustained until 1997. Following
1997, there is a drop in both Quebec and the Rest of Canada, but the drop in Quebec is
steeper. For families with two or more older children, there is also a strong increase following
1988, and a decrease after 1997. As a percentage, these increases are large — between 1987
and 1994 the rate in Quebec moved from 0.073 to 0.084 for a change of 15 per cent. Because
of the error in the construction of the family structure noted above, however, this may be
biased down.
44For example, take a family with ﬁve members, two of whom were born in the past three years. Because
we only observe the presence of one child under three, the procedure I use assigns the family four members at
the beginning of the window rather than the correct number of three. In the Census sample used in section
5, 21.3 per cent of families had more than one child under age six.
287 Reconciliation with AFDC Findings
Aggregate time series studies mostly ﬁnd some responsiveness of fertility to tax incentives.
In contrast, the American AFDC literature has found inconsistent results. In this section,
I attempt to reconcile the strong fertility eﬀects of the ANC found here with ﬁndings from
the rest of the literature. I do this by selecting subsamples from my Census data set that
resemble the samples used in other studies. This permits some insight into the diﬀerences
between the results found here and those from other studies.
I focus on three recent papers that study AFDC payments and fertility.45 First, Rosen-
zweig (1999) employs the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) on young women
through the age range 14 to 22. I replicate this data set by selecting women who are under
age 25. Second, Fairlie and London (1997) use a sample of single mothers with at least one
child from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). I replicate their data
set by using the same selection criteria. Finally, Acs (1996) uses the NLSY on a sample of
single women under age 23. I replicate this data set by selecting single women under age 25.
The results from these regressions appear in Table 7. The regression speciﬁcation used
is the same as Table 4 column (d). The point estimates from the ﬁrst and third regression
show a very small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect. The second speciﬁcation shows a large
eﬀect, but it is imprecisely estimated and so it is also statistically indistinguishable from zero.
These results suggest that, in general, women who are single and who are younger may be less
responsive to the ANC than other women. These types of systematic diﬀerences between
women likely to collect AFDC and all women may explain the diﬀerent results found in
AFDC studies and the ANC results presented above.
To look more closely at heterogeneity in the response to the ANC, I present in Table 8
results from regressions incorporating interactions of Quebec and 1996 dummy with several
characteristics.46 Column (a) shows the coeﬃcient on the interaction of Quebec and 1996
dummy with Married. This interaction term is not signiﬁcant, which suggests that any
diﬀerences in the responsiveness of single and married women to the policy is not attributable
45Many other papers in the AFDC literature (for example, Hoynes (1997a)) focus on the female headship
decision, which combines marital and fertility choices. The studies chosen here for replication focus more
directly on the fertility decision.
46In each case separate interactions of the characteristic with both Quebec and 1996 dummy are included
in order to isolate the response of the policy from Quebec and period speciﬁc eﬀects.
29to their marital status, but to other characteristics that diﬀer between the two groups of
women.47 Column (b) reports the results from a regression including an interaction of Quebec
and 1996 dummy with Female age 25-34. The coeﬃcient is positive, but not signiﬁcant.
Again, this provides no evidence that age alone leads older women in the sample to be more
responsive to the policy than younger women. The next column shows the results from
a regression with interactions between Quebec and 1996 dummy and the female education
variables. The excluded category is women with less than high school education. Again,
none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant.
Column (d) displays the estimated coeﬃcient for a regression that includes an interaction
between Quebec and 1996 dummy and Family income. The estimate of 0.078 implies that
an increase in family income of $100,000 increases the policy responsiveness from 0.036 to
0.114 percentage points. This suggests a strong income eﬀect in policy responsiveness. The
ﬁnal column in the table includes all the interaction terms from the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations.
This speciﬁcation also shows a strong income eﬀect in the responsiveness of policy. Women
with access to less non-labor income are not as responsive to the ANC as women with more
non-labor income. This eﬀect persists on the subsample of women with positive non-labor
income, suggesting that this result is not driven by diﬀerence between women with no non-
labor income and those with positive non-labor income.48
In contrast, Rosenzweig (1999) ﬁnds that the responsiveness of fertility to AFDC beneﬁts
is much smaller among women who may have had access to more resources.49 This is most
likely due to a decreasing likelihood that AFDC beneﬁts are an important part of expected
income as the woman’s resources grow. So, it is not clear whether Rosenzweig’s ﬁnding
reﬂects a decreasing expected beneﬁt or a decreasing responsiveness to beneﬁts.
There are many possible interpretations of the observed increase in responsiveness with
income. For example, this could be evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the responsive-
47It is conceivable that these results are driven not by diﬀerences in responsiveness across groups of
women, but by diﬀerences in the incentives they faced under the parity-based structure of the ANC. I
also ran regressions interacting the same set of characteristics with the ANC beneﬁt amounts, rather than
the Quebec - 1996 dummy interaction. These regressions account for the intensity of the incentive faced
by diﬀerent families, and showed similar results to the regressions using the simple Quebec - 1996 dummy
interaction.
48I thank Hilary Hoynes for this suggestion.
49Rosenzweig selects subsamples based on the income of the young woman’s parents. Those with parental
income over ten thousand dollars were much less responsive to AFDC beneﬁts.
30ness of women to these incentives. If high income women diﬀer in some unobserved way from
low income women, then the higher responsiveness of high income women may be reﬂecting
this unobserved characteristic. As well, the income measure used here may not be exogenous.
If there is positive assortative matching among spouses, then the income measure may be
related to wife’s earnings capacity, and so be related to the cost of children. This would
complicate the interpretation of any income eﬀects using this measure of family income.
Another potential explanation can be drawn from the model developed by Becker and
Tomes (1976). Their model implies a U-shaped path for the desired number of children
as income rises.50 This means that at low income levels, the overall income elasticity of
demand for children is negative, whereas at high income levels it is positive. This produces
a useful prediction that may help in understanding the eﬀect of an exogenous change in the
price of children. At low income levels, this model predicts that the substitution and the
income eﬀects work in opposite directions, while at high income levels the income eﬀect will
reinforce the substitution eﬀect. This occurs in the model because low income women given
more income prefer to spend more on the children they already have rather than increasing
the size of the family. This may explain the weak price response among low income women.
This section has looked at the responsiveness of subsamples of women chosen to resemble
the data sets constructed in the AFDC literature. Among these women, the hypothesis
that the policy response is zero cannot be rejected. This is consistent with researchers who
have found only insigniﬁcant eﬀects of welfare on fertility. Furthermore, this suggests that
the results from the AFDC literature do not generalize to all women. In regressions using
interactions of the policy variable with diﬀerent characteristics, the responsiveness of women
increases with non-wife income.
50They generate this result by adding heritable endowments of child quality to the Becker and Lewis
(1973) model. With heritable quality endowments, the income elasticity of the own-contribution to quality
is relatively large at low levels of income, and declines as income rises. This means that, at low levels
of income, the child quality income eﬀect will dominate but at higher levels of income the child quantity
income eﬀect will dominate. So, at low levels of income the overall income eﬀect is negative, but then
becomes positive at higher levels of income.
318 Conclusion
This paper has presented new evidence on the relationship between tax incentives and fer-
tility. There are two major ﬁndings. First, the responsiveness of fertility to a birth subsidy
is estimated to be large — up to a 25 per cent increase in fertility for families eligible for the
full amount. A C$1,000 increase in ﬁrst-year beneﬁts is estimated to increase the probability
of having a child by 16.9 per cent. Second, there is evidence of heterogeneity in the response
to the policy. This heterogeneity may help to reconcile the results with evidence on AFDC
and fertility, and suggests that ﬁndings about AFDC and fertility do not generalize to all
women.
This evidence supports the hypothesis that prices matter for family fertility decisions.
This, in turn, carries implications for the interpretation of the optimal tax models of Nerlove
et al. (1984) and Batina (1986). Their models suggest that the design of tax and transfer sys-
tems should take into account the response of fertility to tax measures. Speciﬁcally Nerlove
et al. assume that the most disadvantaged individual has the most children, while the results
in Batina’s model hinge critically on assumptions about the diﬀerences in fertility elasticities
across income groups. The estimates presented in this paper help the interpretation of the
models by providing evidence on the signs and magnitudes of the relevant elasticities.
32A Variable Deﬁnitions
Total Fertility Rate: For each year in a given jurisdiction the number of births for women in
seven ﬁve-year age groups covering women from age 15 to 49 is divided by the population of
women in the corresponding age group. These seven birth rates are summed, then multiplied
by ﬁve to get the total fertility rate. The birth data come from Statistics Canada catalogues
84-204 and 84-210. The population data come from CANSIM series C894142 and C892552.
Had a child: Takes the value 1 if at least one child under age six in the family on Census
day; otherwise equal to 0.
Zero older children: Takes the value 1 if no children age six or older in the family on
Census day; otherwise equal to 0.
One older child: Takes the value 1 if one child age six or older in the family on Census
day; otherwise equal to 0.
Two or more older children: Takes the value 1 if two or more children age six or older in
the family on Census day; otherwise equal to 0.
Male / Female less than high school: Takes the value 1 if did not receive high school
diploma; otherwise equal to 0. For single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Male / Female high school: Takes the value 1 if received high school diploma, but no
further education; otherwise equal to 0. For single females, the male variable takes the value
0.
Male / Female post high school: Takes the value 1 if pursued further education past high
school, but did not receive university degree; otherwise equal to 0. For single females, the
male variable takes the value 0.
Male / Female university degree: Takes the value 1 if received university degree; otherwise
equal to 0. For single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Married: Takes the value 1 if female is legally married or in common-law relationship;
otherwise equal to 0.
Live in urban area: Takes the value 1 if family lives in a community of population 100,000
or greater; otherwise equal to 0.
Male / Female immigrant: Takes the value 1if an immigrant; otherwise equal to 0. For
single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Male / Female allophone: Takes the value 1 if mother tongue is neither French nor
English; 0 otherwise. For single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Male / Female anglophone: Takes the value 1 if mother tongue is English; 0 otherwise.
For single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Male / Female francophone: Takes the value 1 if mother tongue is French; 0 otherwise.
For single females, the male variable takes the value 0.
Family income: The sum of male wages and salaries, male self-employment income, male
investment income, and female investment income; in 1995 Canadian dollars.
Provincial GDP growth: Constructed as the average rate of real provincial GDP growth
over the six years in the Census window; data from CANSIM, various series.
Provincial migration rate: Constructed as the net number of inter-provincial migrants
divided by provincial population, averaged over the six years in the Census window; data
from CANSIM, various series.
33Provincial education spending: Constructed as the total provincial government spending
on elementary and secondary education divided by the population in the age range 0 to 17;
data from CANSIM, various series; in 1995 Canadian dollars.
B Falsiﬁcation Checks
This appendix reports results from regressions where no eﬀect is expected in order to enhance
the credibility of the causal link drawn from the evidence. The regressions reported in
section 5 identify a diﬀerential trend in the fertility of women in Quebec versus the rest of
Canada. As well, this trend is shown to be increasing in the parity of the next child to be
born. The control variables included in the regressions account for the eﬀects of observable
characteristics on fertility, and leave any remaining trend to be explained by the existence
of the ANC program. The credibility of this interpretation as causal becomes weaker to the
extent that strong trends in fertility exist in other provinces where none are expected. For
example, in a comparison of the fertility of families observed in the 1986 Census to those in
the 1991 Census, no persistent diﬀerences between Quebec and the rest of Canada should
be observed, since the ANC had no material eﬀect on families during either of these periods.
Similarly, a comparison of any particular province (other than Quebec) with the rest of the
country should not produce signiﬁcant program eﬀects, since no families outside Quebec
were eligible for the ANC. I next explore these falsiﬁcation strategies to try and ﬁnd an
eﬀect where there should be none.
Table 9 displays results from regressions using the strategies outlined above. The ﬁrst
column reports the estimates for regressions based on the full set of control variables, using
the interaction of Quebec and the dummy for the later Census year as the variable of interest.
In columns 2 through 4 I report the estimates from a pooled regression like that in Table
5. The results for the 1986 and 1991 Census comparison in panel A of the table show no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the trends in fertility in Quebec versus the rest of
Canada over this period. When the Quebec and Census year interaction is further interacted
with the family types in a pooled regression, no obvious pattern in the estimates is evident.
This suggests that, in the period preceding the introduction of the ANC, there were no
strong diﬀerences in fertility trends in Quebec and the rest of Canada.
The balance of the table in panel B reports results from regressions comparing each of
the ten jurisdictions outside Quebec in turn with the other nine. (In all cases, Quebec
observations are deleted for these regressions.) In the ﬁrst column, both Newfoundland and
34Saskatchewan show signiﬁcant declines in fertility from 1991 to 1996.51 From this evidence,
it seems that Quebec is not alone in experiencing a statistically signiﬁcant shock to its
fertility over these years. However, the pooled regression results for neither Newfoundland
nor Saskatchewan in columns 2 through 4 show a consistent pattern of signiﬁcant eﬀects by
family type. Thus, the results in Table 5 for Quebec are unique in exhibiting a consistent
pattern of signiﬁcant eﬀects for diﬀerent family types.
C Analysis Using Total Child Beneﬁts
In this appendix I examine regressions that use beneﬁt levels rather than dummy variables
as the key explanatory variables. Regressions on beneﬁt levels can be interpreted as a Local
Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) in the sense of Imbens and Angrist (1994).52 Consider the
determination of beneﬁts as a ‘ﬁrst stage’ regression, with family type, province of residence,
and year as regressors. The estimated eﬀect of this beneﬁt on fertility in the ‘second stage’
could be interpreted as a LATE that measures the increment to fertility caused by the change
in beneﬁts resulting from moving from not being a resident of Quebec during the ANC period
to being a resident of Quebec during the ANC period.
Below I present some descriptive statistics for total child beneﬁts across jurisdictions,
years, and family types. This is followed by the results of regressions on the dollar value
of beneﬁts, including results that attempt to account for the endogeneity of income-tested
beneﬁts to fertility.
C.1 Descriptive Statistics
In addition to the ANC, families receive several other tax beneﬁts related to children. For
example, a family residing in Quebec in 1989 with a new child may have received the ANC,
the Allowance for Young Children, the Quebec and the Federal Family Allowance, as well
as refundable and non-refundable child tax credits. By combining the impact of these ﬁscal
measures, the total tax incentives to have a child for each family in the data set can be
calculated. In this section, I present summary statistics for the magnitude of the ﬁscal
51Saskatchewan and Newfoundland had the largest out-migration rates among the provinces for this period.
Diﬀerent fertility behavior among migrants and non-migrants may have contributed to the drop in fertility
in these provinces.
52Meyer (1995) makes a similar point about the causal interpretation of this type of parameter, but does
not relate it to the LATE.
35incentives followed by regression results using these variables to estimate the inﬂuence of tax
incentives on fertility.
The main incentive variables used in the analysis are calculated over two time horizons,
one year and ﬁve years. This distinction may be informative because some of the family
beneﬁts are paid continuously from the year of birth until the child becomes an adult, while
others are one-time payments or of limited duration. Because the year of birth of a child
within the Census window is unknown, the incentives facing each family to have another
child are calculated for each year in the Census window. The one-year beneﬁt is then formed
as an average of these six beneﬁt calculations. For beneﬁts over a ﬁve year horizon, the
annual ﬁscal ﬂow over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the child’s life is discounted by a three per cent
rate of time preference and summed. This calculation is repeated for each of the six potential
years of birth in Census window, and averaged. Further details on the methodology and the
child beneﬁt programs are included in Appendix C.
Table 10 displays the means and standard deviations of the incentive variables for sub-
samples consisting of residents of Quebec and the rest of Canada. Panel A of the table pools
together all family types, with panels B through D breaking down the sample into subsets
deﬁned by the number of children in the family at the beginning of the Census window. All
statistics are reported separately for data derived from the 1991 and 1996 Censuses, and all
values are in 1995 Canadian dollars. The ﬁrst column reports the statistics for the ANC for
residents of Quebec. Across all family types, the average family would have received $191
from the ANC in the years prior to the 1991 Census, and $635 in the years before the 1996
Census. Women in the 1991 Census had some exposure to the ANC during the Census win-
dow, while women in the 1996 Census were exposed to the full force of the program. In the
1996 sample, families with no other children would have received on average $528 through
the ANC. The beneﬁt for families with one other child is identical because a child of second
parity receives only one payment in the ﬁrst year, with the second payment coming on the
child’s ﬁrst birthday. The ANC beneﬁt rises to $1,646 for families for whom the additional
child would be of third or higher parity.53
The second column shows the sum of all the beneﬁts payable to a family with a new
child, but excluding the ANC. The third column reports the total beneﬁt levels for each of
the family types, which is the sum of the ﬁrst two columns. The fourth column contains the
same total beneﬁt statistics for residents of the rest of Canada outside Quebec, who were
53The standard deviations for these beneﬁts is each zero because all families of each type receive the
identical beneﬁt.
36ineligible for the ANC. Between 1991 and 1996, there were many changes to federal child
beneﬁts.54 The family allowance, refundable and non-refundable tax credits ended in 1992
and were replaced by a new income-tested child tax beneﬁt. However, the total of the other
beneﬁts for families in Quebec shows little change on average from the 1991 to the 1996
sample. On average, the change is $60, which is only 3.6 per cent of the 1991 total. Thus,
most of the variation in average beneﬁts for Quebec residents across time is driven by the
ANC. For residents of the rest of Canada, total beneﬁts do not change much on average —
only $9 between 1991 and 1996 — which suggests that the net mean impact of changes to
federal family policy on incentives is negligible.
I again draw on the equivalence scales estimated by Phipps (1998) to assess the magnitude
of these incentives. Using these scales in Section 3, I calculated the average annual cost of
a ﬁrst child to be $7935, a second child $6348, and a third child $5324. Taking the total
one-year child beneﬁts in the 1996 sample in Table 10, this implies that the child beneﬁts
represent a subsidy of 24.9 per cent, 34.2 per cent, and 80.4 per cent for ﬁrst, second, and
third children respectively in Quebec. In the rest of Canada, the subsidies as a percentage
of the cost of children are 13.0, 17.4, and 27.0 per cent for ﬁrst, second, and third children
respectively. These calculations indicate that the subsidies in the tax system are large, and
especially so for families in Quebec.
The last four columns of the table repeat the analysis with the ﬁve-year incentive measure.
During the ﬁrst ﬁve years of a child’s life, the only beneﬁt that pays diﬀerent amounts at
diﬀerent ages is the ANC. Accordingly, the ANC totals diﬀer relative to the other beneﬁts in
the ﬁve-year horizon calculations. For families having their second child, the ﬁve-year total
is now higher than for families having their ﬁrst child, since the ﬁve-year total also includes
the second $500 payment made on the child’s ﬁrst birthday. For families residing in Quebec
facing the birth of a third child, the discounted sum of the total beneﬁts received over the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the child’s life is $19,363. This is more than double the total for Quebec
families with a ﬁrst child, or for any type of family in the rest of Canada.
C.2 Correcting for Endogeneity
The ANC was a non-taxable transfer, but many of the other child beneﬁts depend on the
level of family income. For example, the federal Child Tax Credit was reduced by a rate of
ﬁve per cent for every dollar of family income over a certain threshold ($25,921 in 1993). This
54For further detail, see Appendix D.
37raises the possibility that these beneﬁts are endogenous to the decision to bear a child. This
potential endogeneity arises because a higher beneﬁt provides an incentive for a woman to
have a child, but the birth of a child may also cause a decrease in the woman’s labor market
activity. Lower labor market earnings leads mechanically to an increase in her income-tested
child beneﬁts. This may lead to an upward bias in the estimate of the response of fertility
to incentives.
A solution to this problem lies in ﬁnding an instrument that is correlated with child
beneﬁts, yet exogenous to the decision to bear a child. The changes in child beneﬁts be-
tween 1991 and 1996 provide an opportunity to form such an instrument. The changes in
government policy are plausibly exogenous to the decision of an individual woman to have a
child. By exploiting the exogeneity of these reforms, I can construct an instrument that has
predictive power for the level of beneﬁts, yet is not related to individual fertility decisions.55
The calculation is made as follows. I construct simulated instruments in the spirit of Currie
and Gruber (1996) for cells deﬁned by province, year, and number of older children.56 I then
assign these simulated beneﬁts to the women in my data set. The simulated beneﬁts should
have predictive power for the actual level of beneﬁts received by women, but by construction
will be unrelated to their labor force decisions, thus avoiding the endogeneity that may bias
estimates using their actual beneﬁts.57
Table 11 reports the results from the regressions using the ﬁrst-year and the ﬁve-year
beneﬁt entitlement of the family if it had another child (measured in $1,000) as the policy
variable of interest. The full set of control variables is included in the regression. The
dependent variable for the regressions remains the same — the binary variable Had a child.
I depart from the previous regressions by estimating the models as a linear probability model
using OLS instead of as a probit. This facilitates the estimation of two-stage least squares
(2SLS) models using the instrument.58 For all regressions, the coeﬃcient on the level of
the beneﬁt entitlement is reported, along with the corresponding percentage increase in
the fertility rate implied by the estimate for a $1,000 increase in annual child beneﬁts. I
provide an elasticity calculation along with the reported coeﬃcients. The beneﬁt elasticity
is calculated as the percentage change in the probability of having a child divided by the
55This instrumental variables strategy is similar to that used by, for example, Currie and Gruber (1996)
to estimate the eﬀect of health insurance for children on health outcomes.
56For each simulated individual I assigned the sample average labor market earnings for the husband and
the wife. The simulated individuals were assumed to be married.
57The F-statistic for the ﬁrst stage regression is 11;435. The t-statistic on the simulated instrument is
142:98.
58The ﬁt of the probit model and the linear probability model with the data is quite similar.
38percentage change in the child beneﬁt at the mean.
Panel A of the table uses the ﬁrst-year beneﬁts incentive variable. The ﬁrst and second
columns of the table present the OLS and 2SLS estimates using the total child beneﬁt
entitlement, including all programs. The OLS estimate is 0.129, which implies a 29.7 per
cent increase in fertility for an increase of $1,000 in total beneﬁts. This is almost twice the
magnitude of the estimate obtained using the ANC alone in table 6. The 2SLS estimate,
however, is 0.077, which implies a 17.6 per cent increase in fertility for a $1,000 increase in
annual beneﬁts. The beneﬁt elasticity is also lower in the 2SLS results, at 0.236. The lower
panel of the table repeats the regressions for the ﬁve-year beneﬁts incentive variable. The
estimates are slightly less than one ﬁfth of the results using ﬁrst-year beneﬁts, suggesting
that the response does not depend on the timing of the receipt of beneﬁts.
In summary, the total ﬁscal incentives to have children in Canada during this period
were large, especially in Quebec. I ﬁnd that accounting for the endogeneity of income-tested
beneﬁts to fertility is important, but that the impact of ﬁscal incentives on fertility is still
large.
D Institutions and Methodologies for the Beneﬁt Cal-
culator
This appendix provides more detail about transfers to families with children, and then de-
scribes the methodology used for the incentive variable calculations.
D.1 Transfers to Families with Children in Canada
During the period spanned by the Census window for the 1991 and the 1996 Censuses,
Canadian families were potentially eligible for eleven distinct ﬁscal measures through the
tax and transfer system. Each is described below. Further detail on these measures can be
found in Canadian Tax Foundation (various years), Qu´ ebec (1992), and HRDC (1999).
D.1.1 The Quebec Allowance for Newborn Children
The Allowance for Newborn Children was introduced on May 1st, 1988 and was cancelled
on October 1, 1997. This non-taxable beneﬁt was paid upon the birth of a child, or upon
the adoption of a child under age ﬁve according to the rank of the child among the children
under age 18 currently residing with the family. The initial rates were $500 immediately
39for a ﬁrst or second child, and eight quarterly $375 payments for each child of rank three
or higher. In May 1989, the rates changed so that a second child received a second $500
payment on his or her ﬁrst birthday. For births of children of rank three or more, the $375
quarterly payments now continued for twelve quarters. As of May 1990, the $375 payments
for children of rank three or more was extended to a length of 16 quarters. As of May 1991,
the $375 payments for children of rank three or more was extended to a length of 20 quarters.
As of May 1992, the 20 quarterly payments for children of rank three or more were increased
to $400 per quarter.
D.1.2 Quebec Dependent Deduction / Credit
Through agreements with the Federal Government, Quebec sets its own base for taxation. In
1986 and 1987 a deduction for dependents under 21 could be claimed, which diﬀered by the
rank of the child. From 1988, these deductions were transformed into non-refundable credits.
A person living alone, a married person, and a person heading a single-parent family receive
additional credits as well. In 1995, the dependent child credit was $520 for the ﬁrst child
and $450 for each subsequent child. The person living alone credit was $210, the married
person credit was $1,180, and the single parent family credit was $1,300.
D.1.3 Quebec Family Allowance
In Quebec, families received a family allowance from the provincial government during the
period 1974 to 1997. This family allowance was paid monthly, and diﬀered according to
the rank of the child. It was not treated as taxable income. In 1995, the Quebec Family
Allowance paid $130 annually for ﬁrst children, $174 for second children, $218 for third
children, and $261 for children of fourth or higher rank.
D.1.4 Quebec Availability Allowance
From 1981 to 1988, Quebec mothers were eligible for a transfer for children under age six
if the mother was out of the labor force. The Availability Allowance diﬀered by the rank
of the child. When it was cancelled, it was replaced by the Quebec Allowance for Young
Children. In its ﬁnal year, the Availability Allowance paid $100 for one child under six, $200
for a second child under six, and $500 for a third child under six.
40D.1.5 Quebec Allowance for Young Children
The Allowance for Young Children made monthly payments to families with children under
age six according to the rank of each child. This beneﬁt was paid from 1989 to 1997. In
1995, a family with one child under six received an annual payment of $117. For a second
child under six, the family received an additional $234, and for a third an additional $585.
D.1.6 The Federal Child Tax Credit
The Child Tax Credit was introduced in 1978 and was cancelled in 1992. The non-taxable
beneﬁt consisted of an annual ﬂat amount per child, which was gradually reduced for family
incomes over a certain threshold. In 1988, a supplementary beneﬁt for children under seven
was introduced. This beneﬁt was replaced by the Federal Child Tax Beneﬁt (described
below) in 1993. In its ﬁnal year in 1992, the Child Tax Credit paid $601 per child with a
supplement of $213 for each child under seven. The threshold level of income was $25,921.
D.1.7 The Federal Dependent Deduction / Credit
Until 1987, a deduction from taxable income could be claimed for each dependent under
eighteen in the family. Following the income tax reform taking eﬀect in 1988, this deduction
was transformed into a non-refundable tax credit. From 1990, the size of the credit was
doubled for children of third rank or higher within the family. In 1993, this credit was folded
into the new Child Tax Beneﬁt. In 1992, the credit was $399 for the ﬁrst two children and
$798 for children of third and higher rank.
D.1.8 The Federal Sales Tax Credit
The Sales Tax Credit was introduced in 1986. The beneﬁt consists of a ﬂat rate for each
parent, plus a ﬂat amount per child. The beneﬁt is reduced for family incomes above a
threshold, but is treated as taxable income. A supplement for single adults and parents was
introduced in 1991, and is phased in for incomes over a certain threshold. In 1995, the credit
paid $199 per adult, $105 per child, and a supplement single-headed households was phased
in at two per cent for incomes over $6,456, to a maximum of $105. The reduction rate for
the beneﬁt in 1995 was ﬁve per cent for incomes over $25,921.
41D.1.9 The Federal Family Allowance
The Family Allowance was reformed substantially in 1974, and maintained the same structure
until it was replaced by the Child Tax Beneﬁt in 1993. The beneﬁt took the form of a monthly,
taxable beneﬁt for each child under eighteen in the family. With two exceptions, the beneﬁt
was paid at a ﬂat rate per child. In Alberta, the beneﬁt depended on the age of the child. In
Quebec, the beneﬁt depended on the rank of the child within the family, with higher-rank
children earning a larger beneﬁt. From 1989, the federal Family Allowance was subject to
a claw back of 15% of income over a certain threshold. In 1992, the Family Allowance paid
beneﬁts at an annual rate of $418. In Quebec, the beneﬁt was $267 for ﬁrst children, $399 for
second, and $996 for children of third or higher rank. The clawback threshold was $53,215.
D.1.10 The Federal Child Tax Beneﬁt
In 1993, the Child Tax Credit, federal dependent non-refundable credit, and the Family
Allowance were replaced with the Child Tax Beneﬁt. Similar to the Family Allowance, the
Child Tax Beneﬁt pays beneﬁts according to the child’s age in Alberta and rank in Quebec.
The base Child Tax Beneﬁt in 1995 paid an annual beneﬁt of $1,020 in most of the country,
but in Quebec the rates were $868 for the ﬁrst child, $1,023 for the second, and $1,596 for a
third or higher ranked child. A supplement for third and additional children ($75 in 1995)
is paid. A second supplement for children under seven ($213 in 1995) is also paid. On top
of this beneﬁt, a working income supplement for families with children is paid for incomes
surpassing one threshold, and then reduced for incomes over another threshold. For 1995,
the working income supplement increased at eight per cent for incomes over $3,750 until
reaching $500, then was decreased by ten per cent of income over $20,921. The total sum of
this beneﬁt is reduced for family income above a certain threshold ($25,921 in 1995). The
reduction rate is 2.5 per cent of income over the threshold for only children, and ﬁve per
cent for families with more than one child.
D.2 Methodology for the Beneﬁt Calculations
The beneﬁt calculator was constructed as follows. I start with the family structure at the
beginning of the Census window. For each year, I calculate the child beneﬁts owed to
the family based on the number of children it had at the beginning of the window. This
calculation is repeated with an additional child added to the family. The diﬀerence in these
two calculations represents the extra child beneﬁts payable to the family upon the birth
42of another child in that year. This calculation is repeated for the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the
child’s life (discounting by 3% per year time preference) and summed to ﬁnd the ﬁve-year
beneﬁts. The whole calculation is repeated for the six years in the Census window, with the
ﬁnal one-year and ﬁve-year beneﬁt measures calculated as the average over the years in the
Census window. Gross income was calculated as the sum of male and female salaries and
wages, self-employment earnings, and investment income in the Census year, deﬂated by the
Consumer Price Index back to the relevant year.
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53Table 1: Cohort Fertility Rates
Years of Age Groups
Birth age 15-19 age 20-24 age 25-29 age 30-34 age 35-39 age 40-44
1943-1947 29.83 139.20 119.14 68.13 17.56 2.59
1948-1952 23.27 92.29 132.26 62.06 17.01 3.33
1953-1957 17.47 92.20 119.07 59.95 23.94 3.88
1958-1962 19.06 81.43 110.12 80.89 26.58
1963-1967 15.05 69.07 129.71 79.61
1968-1972 15.67 77.60 111.72
1973-1977 17.89 66.95
1978-1982 15.60
Note: Reported is the average rate of births per one thousand women in Quebec.
Years in which the ANC is active are shaded.
54Table 2: Sample Characteristics
Rest Rest
All of All of
Observations Quebec Canada Observations Quebec Canada
Observations 74400 20285 54115 62485 16453 46302
Had  a  child 0.428 0.418 0.432 0.444 0.451 0.441
Zero  older  children 0.723 0.740 0.716 0.732 0.754 0.724
One  older  child 0.154 0.158 0.153 0.153 0.150 0.154
Two  or  more  older  children 0.123 0.102 0.131 0.115 0.096 0.122
Quebec 0.273 1.000 0.000 0.263 1.000 0.000
Rest  of  Canada 0.727 0.000 1.000 0.737 0.000 1.000
Female  age  15-24 0.224 0.215 0.227 0.218 0.218 0.218
Female  age  25-34 0.776 0.785 0.773 0.782 0.782 0.782
Male  age  15-24 0.084 0.086 0.083 0.083 0.088 0.081
Male  age  25-34 0.656 0.658 0.655 0.625 0.628 0.624
Male  age  35-44 0.239 0.233 0.242 0.269 0.260 0.272
Male  age  45+ 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.023
Female  less  than  high  school 0.238 0.237 0.238 0.200 0.195 0.202
Female  high  school 0.184 0.183 0.184 0.155 0.154 0.155
Female  post  high  school 0.455 0.463 0.453 0.489 0.485 0.491
Female  university  degree 0.172 0.160 0.177 0.229 0.238 0.225
Male  less  than  high  school 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.226 0.227 0.225
Male  high  school 0.153 0.163 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.148
Male  post  high  school 0.459 0.451 0.462 0.484 0.473 0.488
Male  university  degree 0.128 0.126 0.128 0.143 0.153 0.139
Married 0.713 0.735 0.705 0.683 0.697 0.678
Live  in  urban  area 0.598 0.626 0.588 0.602 0.649 0.585
Female  immigrant 0.095 0.046 0.113 0.110 0.054 0.130
Male  immigrant 0.119 0.064 0.140 0.127 0.068 0.148
Female  allophone 0.096 0.055 0.111 0.111 0.070 0.125
Female  anglophone 0.630 0.070 0.839 0.630 0.066 0.831
Female  francophone 0.274 0.875 0.049 0.260 0.864 0.043
Male  allophone 0.114 0.069 0.132 0.125 0.080 0.142
Male  anglophone 0.605 0.063 0.817 0.611 0.066 0.811
Male  francophone 0.281 0.869 0.052 0.264 0.854 0.047
Family  income 24749 23242 25314 21593 20196 22092
Provincial  GDP  growth 3.22 2.85 3.36 1.25 0.91 1.37
Provincial  net  migration  rate 0.34 0.17 0.40 0.64 0.35 0.74
Provincial  education  spending 6306 6142 6367 6689 6183 6870
Note:    Reported  are  means  over  all  observations  in  the  relevant  subsample.    Male  variables  are  averaged  over
families  with  a  husband.
1991 1996
55Table 3: Comparing Fertility by Time, Jurisdiction, and Parity
Trend
difference Difference
Mean in  means in Percentage Triple 
1991 1996 (2)  -  (1)  = differences increase difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.    All  Parities
Quebec 0.418 0.451 0.033
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
n 20,285           16,453          
Rest  of  Canada 0.432 0.441 0.009 0.024 5.5%
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
n 54,115           46,032          
B.    Zero  older  children
Quebec 0.393 0.418 0.025
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
n 15,017           12,399          
Rest  of  Canada 0.398 0.407 0.009 0.016 4.0%
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
n 38,754           33,338          
C.    One  older  child
Quebec 0.627 0.677 0.050
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
n 3,207               2,475              
Rest  of  Canada 0.691 0.681 -0.010 0.060 9.7%
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
n 8,262               7,088              
D.    Two  or  more  older  children
Quebec 0.278 0.353 0.075
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
n 2,061               1,579              
Rest  of  Canada 0.321 0.344 0.023 0.052 17.2% 0.036
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020)
n 7,099               5,606              
Notes:  Reported  in  the  first  two  columns  are  the  means  of  the  variable  Had  a  child.    Standard  deviations  appear  below  in
parentheses.    The  percentage  increase  is  calculated  by  dividing  the  difference-in-differences  by  the  sum  of  the  1991  Que-
bec  mean  and  the  1991  to  1996  rest  of  Canada  trend.   
56Table 4: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Had a Child 
Independent Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0003 0.058 0.131 0.132
1996 dummy x Quebec 0.024 * 0.034 * 0.039 * 0.053 *
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
1996 dummy 0.009 * 0.013 * 0.031 * 0.028 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Implied percentage increase in
probability of having a child 5.6% 7.8% 8.7% 12.0%
Quebec -0.014 * -0.021 * -0.005 0.023
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.024)
One older child - 0.205 * 0.193 * 0.192 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Two or more older children - -0.163 * -0.203 * -0.205 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female age 25-34 - 0.187 * 0.107 * 0.107 *
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Female immigrant - 0.032 * 0.052 * 0.055 *
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Female francophone - -0.047 * -0.037 * -0.035 *
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Female anglophone - -0.049 * -0.009 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Female high school - -0.015 * -0.055 * -0.054 *
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female post high school - -0.086 * -0.118 * -0.118 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female university degree - -0.192 * -0.235 * -0.236 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male age 25-34 - - 0.148 * 0.148 *
(0.007) (0.007)
Male age 35-44 - - 0.089 * 0.090 *
(0.008) (0.008)
Male age 45+ - - -0.114 * -0.114 *
(0.012) (0.012)
Table continues on next page.
57Table  4  (continued)
Independent  Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Male  immigrant - - 0.014 * 0.017 *
(0.007) (0.007)
Male  francophone - - -0.054 * -0.051 *
(0.008) (0.008)
Male  anglophone - - -0.066 * -0.0642 *
(0.004) (0.007)
Male  high  school - - 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Male  post  high  school - - 0.015 * 0.016 *
(0.004) (0.004)
Male  university  degree - - 0.031 * 0.032 *
(0.006) (0.007)
Married - - 0.206 * 0.202 *
(0.009) (0.009)
lives  in  urban  area - - -0.068 * -0.073 *
(0.003) (0.003)
Family  income  (C$10,000) - - 0.175 * 0.177 *
(0.008) (0.008)
Provincial  GDP  growth - - - 0.005
(0.008)
Provincial  migration  rate - - - -0.015
(0.008)
Provincial  education  spending - - - 0.037 *
(0.018)
Notes:    Reported  coefficients  are  marginal  probabilities  from  probit  regressions  using  the  full  sample  of  136,885  observ-
ations.    A  constant  term  was  included  but  is  not  reported.    Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  below  the  corresponding
estimates.    Coefficients  significant  at  the  five  per  cent  level  are  indicated  with  an  asterisk.    The  implied  percentage
increase  in  the  probability  of  having  a  child  is  calculated  as  described  in  the  text.
58Table 5: Impact of Allowance for Newborn Children on Diﬀerent Family Types
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
Older Children
Two or
Zero One more Pooled
Observations 99508 21032 16345 136885
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1361 0.083 0.028 0.132
Zero older children  x
Quebec x 1996 dummy 0.041 * - - 0.045 *
(0.012) (0.011)
Implied percentage increase in
probability of having a child 9.8% - - 10.7%
One older child  x
Quebec x 1996 dummy - 0.080 * - 0.080 *
(0.020) (0.019)
Implied percentage increase in
probability of having a child - 13.1% - 12.6%
Two or more older children x
Quebec x 1996 dummy - - 0.082 * 0.082 *
(0.028) (0.022)
Implied percentage increase in
probability of having a child - - 24.7% 25.0%
Quebec 0.009 0.036 0.080 0.035
(0.028) (0.049) (0.059) (0.024)
1996 dummy 0.027 * -0.015 0.054 * 0.027 *
(0.012) (0.022) (0.025) (0.011)
One older child - - - 0.209 *
(0.007)
Two or more older children - - - -0.212 *
(0.006)
One older child x Quebec - - - -0.054 *
(0.012)
Two or more other children x Quebec - - - -0.026 *
(0.014)
One other child x 1996 dummy - - - -0.013
(0.010)
Two or more other children x 1996 dummy - - - 0.023 *
(0.011)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes
Notes:  Reported coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions on the relevant subsample. Control
variables as in Table 4 specification (d) are included, but not reported.  Robust standard errors are reported below the
corresponding estimates.  Coefficients significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.  The implied
percentage increase in the probability of having a child is calculated as described in the text.
59Table 6: Regressions Using the Dollar Value of Allowance for Newborn Children Beneﬁts
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
First-year Benefits Five-Year Benefits
ANC ANC
Coefficient on benefit 0.073 * 0.011 *
(0.015) (0.003)
Implied percentage increase in fertility
rate for $1000 increase in benefits 16.9% 2.6%
Benefit elasticity 0.107 --
Notes: Control variables as in Table 4 specification (d) are included, but not reported. 
Coefficients significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.
60Table 7: Results Using Replications of AFDC Data Sets
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
(a) (b) (c)
AFDC Study Rosenzweig (1999) Fairlie and London (1997) Acs (1996)
Selection Criteria Age 15-24 Single Single
At least one child Age 15-24
Observations 30271 7102 14292
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.044 0.114
Quebec x 1996 Dummy 0.003 0.077 0.004
(0.018) (0.043) (0.022)
Notes:  Reported coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions. Control variables as in Table 4 
specification (d) are included, but not reported.  Robust standard errors are reported below the corresponding 
estimates. Coefficients significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.
61Table 8: Heterogeneity in Response to Allowance for Newborn Children
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Quebec x 1996 dummy 0.034 * 0.036 0.074 * 0.036 * 0.061 *
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
Interactions of Quebec x 1996 dummy with:
Married 0.028 0.003
(0.015) (0.018)
Female age 25-34 0.025 0.017
(0.016) (0.017)
Female high school -0.030 -0.040
(0.021) (0.021)
Female post high school -0.027 -0.039 *
(0.017) (0.017)
Female university degree -0.013 -0.035
(0.022) (0.022)
Family Income 0.078 * 0.074 *
(0.028) (0.036)
Notes:  Reported coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions. Control variables
as in Table 4 specification (d) are included, but not reported.  Also included are main effect
interactions of each characteristic (Married, Female age 25-34 etc.) with Quebec and with 1996 
dummy. Robust standard errors are reported below the corresponding estimates.  Coefficients 
significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.
62Table 9: Falsiﬁcation Regressions
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
(b)
Two or
(a) Zero One more
A.  1986 vs 1991
Quebec x 1991 dummy 0.003 0.013 -0.001 -0.056 *
(0.009) (0.011) (0.022) (0.026)
B.  1991 vs 1996
Newfoundland -0.048 * -0.045 -0.050 -0.056
(0.020) (0.024) (0.041) (0.051)
New Brunswick -0.038 -0.040 -0.052 -0.012
(0.033) (0.035) (0.048) (0.059)
Nova Scotia 0.029 0.022 0.039 0.049
(0.018) (0.021) (0.040) (0.048)
Prince Edward Island 0.011 -0.019 -0.016 0.167
(0.045) (0.053) (0.099) (0.114)
Ontario 0.008 0.010 0.020 -0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.023)
Manitoba 0.027 0.015 0.049 0.065
(0.016) (0.018) (0.040) (0.042)
Saskatchewan -0.040 * -0.287 -0.087 * -0.043
(0.016) (0.019) (0.038) (0.037)
Alberta 0.010 0.015 -0.015 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.028) (0.029)
British Columbia 0.001 -0.003 0.008 0.019
(0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.032)
Territories 0.014 -0.041 0.359 * -0.050
(0.054) (0.062) (0.107) (0.117)
Notes:  Reported coefficients are marginal probabilities from probit regressions on the relevant subsample. Control
variables as in Table 4 specification (d) are included, but not reported.  Robust standard errors are reported below
the corresponding estimates.  Coefficients significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk. 
63Table 10: Total Child Beneﬁts
First-year Benefits Five-year Sum of Benefits
Rest Rest
of  of 
Quebec  Canada Quebec  Canada
Other Total Total Other Total Total
ANC Benefits Benefits Benefits ANC Benefits Benefits Benefits
A.  All Parities
1991 191 1651 1843 1101 305 7701 8006 5196
(96) (382) (457) (319) (359) (1805) (2086) (1507)
1996 635 1591 2226 1092 1217 7507 8723 5154
(329) (523) (779) (484) (1866) (2468) (3957) (2281)
B.  Zero older children
1991 159 1527 1686 1045 159 7111 7270 4932
(0) (249) (249) (312) (0) (1176) (1176) (1472)
1996 528 1448 1976 1031 528 6832 7360 4864
(0) (407) (407) (498) (0) (1921) (1921) (2348)
C.  One older child
1991 159 1704 1863 1212 308 7959 8267 5717
(0) (267) (267) (302) (0) (1258) (1258) (1422)
1996 528 1641 2169 1107 1029 7741 8770 5222
(0) (345) (345) (424) (0) (1628) (1628) (2002)
D.  Two or more older children
1991 478 2476 2954 1279 1361 11600 12961 6035
(0) (276) (276) (278) (0) (1302) (1302) (1313)
1996 1646 2637 4283 1439 6918 12437 19355 6789
(0) (327) (327) (276) (0) (1542) (1542) (1304)
Notes:  Reported is the mean child benefit for each subsample.  The standard deviation appears below in parentheses.
64Table 11: Results for Beneﬁt Regressions
Dependent Variable: Had a Child
Total Benefits
OLS 2SLS
A. First Year Benefits
Coefficient on benefit 0.129 * 0.077 *
(0.004) (0.016)
Implied percentage increase in fertility
rate for $1000 increase in benefits 29.7% 17.6%
Benefit elasticity 0.399 0.236
B. Five Year Benefits
Coefficient on benefit 0.027 * 0.011 *
(0.001) (0.003)
Implied percentage increase in fertility
rate for $1000 increase in benefits 6.2% 2.5%
Notes: Control variables as in Table 4 specification (d) are included, but not reported. 
Coefficients significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.
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